How Anger Helps Us Possess Reasons for Action
Forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly.
Abstract: I argue that anger helps us possess reasons to intervene against others. This is because fitting anger disposes us to intervene against others in light of reasons to do so. I propose that anger is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize such interventions, in much the same way that perceptual experience is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize our judgments about our environment. In this way, anger can help us possess reasons that make specific actions rational to perform. Moreover, the significance of anger to practical rationality informs how we should regulate anger, especially the anger of others. Along these lines, I argue that it is wrong to prevent anger to the extent that this prevents someone’s possession of reasons to intervene, and it is right to provoke anger to the extent that this enables someone’s possession of reasons to intervene. 

Mind Design, AI Epistemology, and Outsourcing (Lead author with Susan Schneider and Garrett Mindt)
Forthcoming in special issue of Social Epistemology on the Mind-Technology Problem.
Abstract: From brain machine interfaces to neural implants, present and future technological developments are not merely tools, but will change human beings themselves. Of particular interest is human integration with AI. In this paper, we focus on enhancements that enable us to outsource our own epistemic work to AI. How does outsourcing epistemic work to enhancements affect the authorship of and responsibility for the final product of that work? We argue that in the context of performing and reporting research, outsourcing does not diminish one’s responsibility for mistakes in the final product, in contrast to a recent position expressed by Coeckelbergh and Gunkel that concerns about authorship obscure the ethical and social issues here. Moreover, we suggest that that responsibility may sometimes be shared between oneself and the group that designed, marketed, and sold the enhancement. Our investigation does not aim to settle these issues but instead demonstrates their urgency and develops frameworks for understanding the relevant issues. 

There Are No Irrational Emotions
In Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 103, Issue 2 (2022).
Abstract: Folk and philosophers alike argue whether particular emotions are rational. However, these debates presuppose that emotions are eligible for rationality. Drawing on examples of how we manage our own emotions through strategies such as taking medication, I argue that the general permissibility of such management demonstrates that emotions are ineligible for rationality. It follows that emotions are never irrational or rational. Since neither perception nor emotion are eligible for rationality, this reveals a significant epistemic continuity between them, lending support to perceptual views of emotion. 

Planescape: Torment as Philosophy: Regret Can Change the Nature of a Man
In The Palgrave Handbook of Popular Culture as Philosophy (2024).
Abstract: In the video game Planescape: Torment, players assume the role of the Nameless One, an immortal being who suffers from amnesia. By making choices for the Nameless One, players decide not only what happens to the Nameless One, but also the development of his moral character. In this way, Planescape: Torment invites its players to consider “what can change the nature of a man.” In the game’s canonical ending, the Nameless One regrets the great harm he inflicted on others, and he gives up his immortality to amend his wrongdoing. Thus, the game holds that it is regret that can change someone’s moral character for the better. A defense of this claim about regret can be found in Aristotle’s view that one must practice virtuous actions in order to develop the moral virtues. The alignment system of Planescape: Torment demonstrates a similar connection between action and character: the Nameless One improves his moral character by taking selfless actions. Since regret motivates one to practice virtuous action to make amends for one’s wrongdoing, regret enables one to develop virtue, and so better moral character. Although Spinoza argues that we should avoid feeling regret because it makes us miserable, Planescape: Torment suggests that the painfulness of regret is what makes it an effective source of motivation to practice virtuous actions. 

USS Callister and Non-Player Characters (second author with Russ Hamer)
In Black Mirror and Philosophy: Dark Reflections (2019).
Abstract: This chapter explores the ethics of Robert Daly's actions in the episode “USS Callister”. We consider issues of privacy that relate to him stealing his co-workers DNA in order to scan them into the game, as well as the ethics of how he treats the digital avatars of his co-workers within the game. Examining Daly's actions from a few different approaches, we argue that Daly's actions towards his co-workers avatars are very likely immoral, though ultimately we cannot know without knowing Daly's thoughts. Finally, we end the chapter with some considerations relating to video games in general and the ways in which we must act when we play video games.

• (Under Review) A paper about the ethics of AI emotion recognition with Michael Dale (Hampden-Sydney College)

• (Under Review) A contribution to book symposium for Sophie Grace Chappell's Epiphanies

• (Draft) "Emotional Absences, Epistemic Sentimentalism, and Evaluative Gaslighting"

• (Draft) "AI-Generated Emotional Writing and Respect for Personal Relationships"

• (Early Stage) "AI Emotions and Value Alignment"

• (Early Stage) "A Puzzle about Anger at God" with Andrew del Rio (George Fox University)

• (Early Stage) "Completionism as Video Gaming Vice"